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What distinguishes foreign aid from those  other branches of foreign
policy are  the means through which foreign aid endeavors to  achieve its
purpose.  Its ends  are no different from those  of other branches.  In other
words, from the perspective of foreign aid as  an instrument of foreign
policy, aid is  but the continuation of diplomacy by other means.
-Hans Morgenthau (1960)
In 1973 Congress  initiated a significant departure in U.S. foreign
development assistance policy.  These changes were referred to in
government  as  "New Directions."  In popular and professional discussion
they were  increasingly referred to as  the Basic Human Needs  (BHN) mandate.
Our aim in  this essay is  to  attempt to understand the  sources of the
BHN mandate.  This will  involve examining the evolution of U.S.  development
assistance policy from the mid-1960s  to the early 1970s.
New Directions was addressed to meeting the basic needs of the poorest
people in  the poorest countries.  It was to  involve them directly in the
development process.  The most distinctive feature of New Directions was
that it proposed to  concentrate assistance on food production, rural
development and nutrition, population planning and health, and education.
This marked a departure from the development assistance programs of the
1960s which had emphasized general purpose  resource transfer. 1
An important feature of New Directions was  that  it was primarily a
response to congressional  initiative.  Earlier shifts  in development
assistance policy had been initiated by the executive.In examining the sources of New Directions, we have found it useful to
organize our analysis around the  framework illustrated in Figure 1.  The
framework serves as a typology for organizing our analysis of those factors
that we might expect to  influence official development assistance policy.
The typology can be thought of as a pretheory in which each of its
components provides a context within which the events  that have contributed
to development assistance policy changes can be "thickly described."2
We have identified eight sources of the New Directions orientation:
(1)  the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente;  (2)  a proposed change  in the
accounting practices for the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID); (3)  the evolving needs-oriented strategy of Congress;  (4)  the
increasing assertiveness  of Congress  in making foreign policy;  (5)  changing
mainstream currents  in development thought;  (6)  the declining dominance of
the United States in world affairs;  (7)  waning public support for U.S.
involvement overseas;  and (8)  the formation of a development assistance
coalition.
In constructing the  typology, we draw on work by Rosenau in which the
factors capable of influencing a nation's foreign policy are classified
into a hierarchy consisting of five main levels:  the world (external)
environment, the societal environment of the nation, the governmental
setting, the roles played by central decision makers, and the personality
traits of individual foreign policy elites. 3  Each level is  seen to
represent a cluster of independent variables interacting to influence  the
dependent variable--official development assistance policy.  We add the
category "intellectual sources."  This will refer to the  substantial impact
of development thought on development assistance policy.4The framework contains  three additional elements.  First, we
distinguish four types  of dependent variable--or  four levels of foreign
policy decision.  These are:  behavior, tactics,  strategy, and foreign
policy. 5  It  is  postulated that behavior and tactics change rapidly, while
strategy and foreign policy change relatively slowly.  A key property of
the  levels of decision is  that each higher level  is  postulated to define
the boundaries of each lower level of decision:  a policy defines the  range
of possible alternatives for  strategy, and strategy prescribes  a series of
tactics.
The second element links  each type  of foreign policy decision maker to
its  respective level  of decision and is based upon the organization of
American government.  The postulate  implies that the President and his
advisers comprise  the locus of decision making for foreign policy;  the
congressional committee is  the locus of decision making for strategy;  and
the  government agency is  the  locus of decision making for tactics.  The
postulate  further implies that Presidential involvement and direction
declines at lower levels of decision.  Finally, at  each point of decision
below the Presidential  level,  the decision boundaries will have been
established by the next highest level.7
A final  element is  that development assistance decisions may act as
either inputs  or outputs to  later foreign policy change.  A foreign policy
decision identified as  an independent variable at time t  may give rise to
policy decision at time t+l, which may create change  in the  international
environment at time  t+2,  which might  lead to  feedback effects  on the  levels
of analysis themselves at time t+3. 8FIGURE  1.  The  Sources  of  American  Development  Assistance
Policy as  a Funnel  of "Causality"
Adapted from Stephen B.  Walker, "Levels of Decision in  American Foreign Policy" (Paper
presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,  New Orleans, LA,
1985),  p.13; and Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and
Process (New York: St. Martins,  1982), p.  531.The  framework is consistent with the microeconomic  theories of
legislative and bureaucratic behavior.9  This literature interprets policy
decisions  in terms  of how they increase the bureaucratic budgets, personal
power, and the prestige or  status of individual decision makers.
The main limitation of our typology is that  it could provide a
potentially endless laundry list of variables that may have given rise  to
New Directions.  It has  little predictive capacity.  It is useful, however,
as  an organizing device around which to  examine the  sources  of change  in
development assistance policy and the linkages  among the several  sources.
Governmental Sources
In this part we consider how the New Directions  initiative was
conditioned by foreign policy during the Kennedy and Nixon administrations,
the internal reform process of USAID.
Administration Sources.  The Kennedy and Johnson foreign policy has
been referred to as  "flexible response."10  According to Gaddis,  this was
an expansive foreign policy supported by a rationale which advocated that
the economy could sustain or even benefit from an increase in domestic and
defense spending.11  In this view, the main objective of "flexible
response" was  to increase  the range of available options prior to
resorting to nuclear war.  This  included placing a new emphasis  on economic
assistance  to the Third World.1 2  Rostow thus views  this era as  a second
cold-war cycle during which communist versus noncommunist methods of
modernization in the  developing world were tested.13
The stage for New Directions may have been set as early as  1961 when
President Kennedy pledged to help the poor countries of the world "not
because the communists  are doing it,  but because it is right."l4  The 1961Foreign Assistance Act  (FAA) reflected this view in its  reduced expression
of concern over communism and communist activity in the Third World as
compared to  the aid legislation of the Mutual Security Act of 1967.15
The 1961 FAA revised the internal arrangement of the Mutual Security
Act and moved the authority for development assistance to  Part I, while
relegating military assistance to Part 11.16  USAID was created in the
State Department as  the administrative and coordinating agency for economic
aid.17  USAID's mandate was  to place greater emphasis on development
capital and technical assistance relative to military aid.  The major
reorientation of the  1961 FAA was that  it sought to base economic aid on
long-range plans related to social as well as economic  aspects of
development.
In 1968,  in what might be  seen as a move to head off mounting
congressional criticism of the foreign aid program,18  President Johnson
appointed the Perkins Committee  to examine the role of development
assistance in the new administration.  The "Perkins Report,"  which seems
to have been heavily influenced by USAID views, essentially recommended the
continuation of the  foreign aid program in  its then current form.19  Among
its chief recommendations,  the report suggested an increase in official
development assistance  levels and a stress on food production, family
planning, science and technology transfer, education, and popular
participation.20
In 1969 a new administration brought with it a significant departure
in foreign policy.2 1  Although detente had earlier origins,  the policy had
been formulated by Nixon and Kissinger and reflected their belief in the
need to redefine  the U.S.  role in a fundamentally changed internationalsystem.  Rostow sees  this period (1969-73) as one  of relative political
equilibrium between the United States  and the  Soviet Union.2 2  As detente
began to take  shape,  it seems  to have laid the  strategic foundation for New
Directions.
A number of analysts have viewed detente as  a "new means to the  old
end of containment,"23 or as  "self-containment on the part of the
Russians."24  Gaddis has characterized the policy as consisting of five
main elements:  (1) to engage the Soviets  in serious negotiations on
substantive  issues;  (2) to  "link" negotiations  in substantive areas  in
order to modify Soviet behavior;  (3) to pressure Moscow by establishing
links between the United States and China;  (4) to phase down American
commitments  in the world;  and  (5) to isolate  the bureaucracy from the
policy-making process.25
The fourth element seems to have been particularly influential in
shaping New Directions.  It was  spelled out for the  first time in some
detail in July 1969, when President Nixon enunciated the Nixon doctrine on
Guam.  In 1970, the President generalized what he termed the "central
thesis"  of the Doctrine:
The United States will participate  in the defense and development
of allies and friends, but cannot and--will not--conceive all  the
plans, design all  the programs,  execute all  the  decisions, and
undertake all  the defense of the free nations of the world.  We will
help when it makes a real difference and is  considered in our
interest.26
In August 1969,  the Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere,
led by Nelson Rockefeller, issued its  report on the  foreign aid program.The study can be viewed as an early attempt to define  the role of economic
assistance within the  context of the Nixon doctrine.  "The Rockefeller
Report" advised that the United States move to a system of tariff
preferences for developing-country imports,  support regional markets, and
participate in regional development banks.  The report also recommended the
establishment of an Economic and Social Development Agency to  supersede
USAID.
27
In his 1970 Foreign Policy Report to  Congress, Nixon's discussion of
economic assistance focused on the partnership approach to aid and
indicated a greater role for multilateral  institutions.  The President said
that the developing countries must assume a larger role in defining their
own development strategies and that trade and private  investment should
play a larger role in development.28
In March 1970,  the Peterson Task Force on International Development
reported its findings to  the President.  The task force had been
commissioned in 1969 when the President first publicly embraced the need to
restyle the aid program.2 9  It was headed by Rudolph Peterson, Chairman of
the Bank of America.  The report may be viewed as an official study which
was  sensitive to  the moods of Congress, the executive and the public. 30
"The Peterson Report" recommended that:  (1) foreign aid policy should
be redesigned so that developing countries could establish their own
priorities and receive assistance  in proportion to their own self-help
efforts;  (2) multilateral lending  institutions should become the major
channel for development assistance;  (3) development and military assistance
programs should be completely separated;  (4) the use of private sector
initiative and resources should be expanded;  (5) foreign aid policy shouldseek popular participation and dispersion of benefits and;  (6) the downward
trend in U.S. ODA should be reversed.31
The programmatic recommendations  of the  report consisted of abolishing
USAID and channeling development assistance through three new institutions:
an International Development Bank for development loans)  an International
Development Institute for technical assistance and research, and an
International Development Council to coordinate U.S.  trade, investment and
financial policy.
In September  1970, Nixon issued a "Special Message to Congress"
proposing reform of the foreign assistance program based directly on the
Peterson proposals.  The  intent was  to initiate a complete overhaul of the
foreign assistance program to  "make it fit with a new foreign policy."  The
President said that he planned to  submit a revised version of the proposals
to Congress  as draft legislation during 1971.32
Nixon's February 1971  report to Congress  suggested that the Nixon
doctrine was being implemented.  The report reiterated support for the
Peterson proposals.33  In April 1971, Nixon sent two draft bills,  the
International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act and the
International Security Assistance Act, to Congress where they died in House
Committee. 34  The bills had drawn heavily from the Peterson recommendations
and to a lesser extent from the Rockefeller Report. 35
Several reasons for  the demise of the bills have been suggested by
Pastor.3 6  In the winter of 1970-71, when there  should have been
consultations among USAID officials, commission members, and Congressmen,
there were none.  This may have been because  the President was not really
interested in reshaping foreign aid during his first term in office or9
because USAID officials had no incentive to  lobby for a bill that would
have eliminated their agency.  More  likely still, Congress simply may not
have  been  enthusiastic  about  the  aid  program.
The President's 1972 report to Congress voiced his concern over the
rejection of the Peterson proposals and he termed 1971 "a year of crisis
for foreign assistance."37  The President's May 1973 report to Congress
emphasized the continued progress of the Nixon doctrine and contained a new
section on U.S. political and economic  interests in the  developing world.
The President asserted that development was tied not only to humanitarian
needs, but to  the stability of developing nations and regions.  The United
States would receive needed energy resources and raw materials in exchange
for machinery and products needed by the developing countries.3
In contrast to the 1972 report, the  1973 report discussed only
improvements  in the foreign aid program.  Improvements cited by the
President  included:  (1) focusing bilateral aid on the key problem areas of
health, education, agriculture, and population planning;  (2) dealing with
recipient countries  as partners more able to plan their own development;
(3) more effective coordination of U.S. bilateral assistance with other
donor countries and agencies;  and (4) substantial support  for multilateral
assistance programs.39
In sum, the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy sought to  "phase down"
American commitments abroad and this was in sharp contrast to the expansive
foreign policy of Kennedy and Johnson.  Nixon and Kissinger appear to have
reached a  satisfactory definition of the  role of development assistance
(with the Peterson Report) only when the Nixon doctrine had begun to
mature.  Although Congress rejected the Peterson proposals,  in 1973  it was10
to  introduce its own foreign assistance legislation which seemed remarkably
consistent with the Nixon doctrine's  "low keyed" approach to U.S.
involvement in world affairs.
USAID Sources.  During 1971 USAID began a number of program and
administrative reforms designed to respond to  the President's Special
Message to Congress of September 1970  and his  legislative proposals of
April 1971.  In the fall  of 1971, when it became clear that  Congress would
delay action on Nixon's foreign aid proposals, USAID accelerated its
internal reform process.4 0  Out of this process came USAID's primary
contribution to New Directions--the proposal  to  divide the USAID budget
along functional lines.41
In the fall  of 1971, USAID Administrator John Hannah appointed Ernest
Stern, who was  then at the World Bank, to chair a task force on agency
reorganization.4 2  The "Stern Committee" began its work in the fall of 1971
and filed its report  in December.  The report acknowledged the press of
human needs but did not suggest a new strategy for alleviating them.  It
did, however, strongly recommend a sectoral approach for USAID
authorizations.4 3  USAID saw the  sectoral approach as  a way to refocus
congressional attention on the program.44  It was  thought that the  tactic
of targeting assistance  on areas  such as  food, education and health would
appeal  to certain members  of Congress and be less  subject to attack.4 5
Maurice J. Williams, who was then Deputy Administrator of USAID,
recalls that at  the end of 1971 Hannah took his senior staff to a  retreat
and brainstorming session at Arlie House  in Virginia.  Over the  Christmas
holiday, Williams had the assignment to pull together the  conclusions from
that session which he  admits had been "a bit all over the place."4 611
Williams noted that Hannah had a strong "people-oriented" approach to
development, was well respected in Congress, and politically very astute.
By January 1972, Hannah had the results of the brainstorming and his own
thinking and began to announce a series of internal reforms constituting a
major reorganization of the agency.4 7  The upshot of these changes was the
centralization of decision making and a program focus that emphasized a
more equitable distribution of development benefits.4 8  The changes called
for an increased concentration of USAID resources on agriculture and food
production, with an emphasis on human nutrition, population control, health
care, and low cost education.4
Additional changes within USAID were the separation of the
administration of security and development assistance programs and a
reduction of AID's staff by roughly 30 percent since 1968.  Testifying
before the House on 20 March, 1972, Maurice Williams, stated, "In addition
[to  the  above changes] we are now directing programs to focus more directly
on basic human needs." 50
In July 1972, Hannah spoke with the President about the possibility of
reforming USAID during the next administration.51  Having what he believed
to be consent on the matter, Hannah approved a major "Policy Determination"
and "Policy Background Paper" by October.  Both spelled out a new USAID
policy for encouraging employment generation and more equitable  income
distribution in discussions with developing nations. 52
During the  fall of 1972 Hannah had two bills prepared:  one a
continuation of the existing budget mechanism, the other with functional
categories.  The draft functional bill was informally presented to the  two
authorizing and appropriating committees at the  same time that it was12
circulated within the executive branch.5 3  Although the committees
apparently liked the  legislation, it was not well received by the
executive 54  The proposals languished at  the Office of Management and
Budget partly because  there were so many of them and no one was quite sure
who should handle them.55
In May 1973, the  administration sent  the Foreign Assistance Act to
Congress unamended.  Anticipating this, Hannah had taken his  ideas to  the
Hill and had formed a working group with researchers from the Overseas
Development Council  (ODC)56  and staff from the House Foreign Affairs
Committee to  consider ways  to implement the bill. 57   Pastor says  that by
the  time OMB rejected the proposals they had already been accepted by the
House.  He notes that at this point USAID disclaimed responsibility for
them.  In summarizing the process,  Pastor says that  it was  "AID's
initiative, congressional redrafting with the help of the ODC, and OMB
acceptance  of a fait accompli." 58
During 1974, USAID cautiously responded to New Directions by shifting
its  accounting practices.  The shift was from a budget broken down into
capital and technical assistance accounts to one divided by functional
accounts reflecting the outlines of the new legislation. 59
Congressional Sources
The 1961 FAA included a sort of "precursor" to the participatory
element of the  BHN mandate.  This was Senator Hubert H. Humphrey's  (D-MN)
amendment which declared that  the purpose of U.S. policy was,  inter alia,
"to encourage  the development and use of cooperatives, credit unions,  and
savings and loan associations." 6 013
The 1962  FAA added amendments declaring in effect that the highest
priority should be given to programs providing loans or guarantees to
institutions  that would supply low interest loans for the purchase of small
farms  and homes,  for small business, or for vocational training.
Additional language authorized the President to support agrarian and land-
tenure reform.61
The 1962  FAA contained a second "precursor" to  the 1973 participatory
strategy.  This was an amendment introduced by Congressman Clement Zablocki
(D-WI) on community development.  The amendment provided that in recipient
countries  "emphasis shall be placed also upon programs  of community
development which will promote  stable and responsible governmental
institutions  at the  local level."62
The 1963 FAA added a subsection which declared that no assistance
would be provided to a project from the Development Loan Fund unless the
President determined that the project would promote economic development.
Moreover, the project had to provide  for "appropriate participation" of
private enterprise.  The 1964  FAA moved further in this  direction by
including a provision to the effect that USAID should make use of U.S.
firms  in financing its capital projects.63
The 1966 FAA added a major forerunner to New Directions.  This was
Title IX on participation.  The amendment was  introduced by Congressman
Donald Fraser (D-MN) and co-sponsored by Congressman Zablocki.64  Marian
Czarnecki, who was chief of staff for  the Foreign Affairs Committee, seems
to have taken the  lead in drafting the  first unofficial version of
Title IX.6 5  Title  IX received considerable support from Congressman
Bradford Morse (R-MA) and 25 other House Republicans.  From both sides its14
justification drew heavily upon the political development literature. 66
Fraser mentioned that he  saw Title IX as encouraging the  "building blocks"
of participatory governance.67  Similarly, the House noted that "there  is a
close relationship between popular participation in  the process of
development and the effectiveness of that process." 68
The original  text of the amendment consisted of a single sentence:
"In carrying out programs authorized in this  chapter, emphasis shall be
placed on assuring maximum participation  in the task of economic
development on the part of people  in the developing countries, through the
encouragement of  democratic, private,  and local  government institutions."69
Programs authorized under Title IX covered nearly the  full range of
foreign assistance  activities.  These included development assistance,  the
Development Loan Fund, technical cooperation programs, development grants,
the Alliance for  Progress, and multilateral and regional programs in
Southeast Asia.70  The new mandate was also assigned to USAID.  The aim and
scope  of Title  IX led Braibanti to  term it  "the most important element of
doctrine  in U.S.  foreign assistance policy." 71
The 1967 FAA expanded and strengthened the mandate by adding
provisions  that recognized the problem of implementing and evaluating
popular participation.72  A new section on the  objectives of development
assistance was appended.7 3  This section included language that emphasized
the building of economic, political, and social institutions  in the
developing countries in order to protect U.S.  security and developing
country  interests. 74  In order to meet these  objectives,  the 1967  FAA
provided that development was primarily the  responsibility of the
developing countries themselves,  that self-help efforts were essential  to,15
successful development, and that assistance would be concentrated in those
countries which took positive steps  to help themselves and to encourage
democratic participation of their peoples. 75
The 1967  FAA also stipulated that the President should take into
account the extent  to which the receiving country was implementing measures
to increase production, storage, and distribution of food.  Additional
criteria included the  extent to which the recipient country was targeting
expenditures  to key areas,  including agriculture, health, and education.76
Section 102 of the  1967 Act included the following provisions:
The first objectives  of assistance  shall be to support the efforts of
less-developed countries  to meet the developmental needs of their
peoples for sufficient food, good health, home ownership, and decent
housing, and the opportunity to gain basic knowledge and skills
required to make their own way forward to a brighter future.  In
supporting these objectives, particular emphasis shall be placed on
utilization of resources for food production and family planning.77
The major policy revisions of the 1967 FAA were not repeated in 1968
or  1969.  During 1968, however, Title X on population planning was enacted
requesting USAID Missions abroad to  take  "all practicable  steps"  to
facilitate development of population projects and programs.78
The foreign aid bills of the early 1970s became the focal point for
legislative battles to  end the Vietnam war.79  It was during this period
that USAID usually functioned on the basis of continuing resolutions at
existing levels of appropriations rather than by annual legislative
mandate.8 0  In 1971, the bill suffered a  serious setback, when for  the
first time,  on October 29,  the Senate voted down its funding, 41-27.16
One reason for the bill's demise is  offered by Watts and Free.  They
say that it was  attacked by conservatives  for its  failure to gain allies in
the developing world, and by liberals who objected to its  large military
component.81  Pastor offers an additional reason.  He says  that Congress
was negatively affected by the U.N. decision to expel Taiwan on 25 October,
1971, which prompted a number of congressional resolutions calling for U.S.
withdrawal from the United Nations  or a reduction of the U.S. contribution
to it. 8 2
In early November, a Senate-passed bill  that separated economic and
military assistance was  sent to Conference which remained deadlocked over
the Mansfield amendment requiring the withdrawal of all troops from
Southeast Asia within six months.  In 1972,  a large number of Senate votes
against the bill indicated continued dissatisfaction with the foreign aid
program.83
The House Initiatives  of 1973.  Grant notes that the House  tried to
aid Hannah's  efforts in the administration.84  Thus on 10 April 1973, a
group of Foreign Affairs  Committee members--14 Democrats and one
Republican--sent a letter  to President Nixon urging him to reform the
foreign aid program on the basis of six principles. 85  Congressman Fraser
led this  group and later noted that the letter arose out of the general
interaction between Committee members and staff.8 6  When the
administration responded with the unamended version of the bill on 3 May, a
bi-partisan group of 26 House Foreign Affairs Committee members responded
in turn with assistance legislation entitled the Mutual Development and
Cooperation Act  (MDCA)  of 1973. 8 717
The MDCA, as well as the  letter which had been sent to  the
administration, had been loosely patterned on the original USAID
proposals.88  The title of the MDCA was meant to reflect the increasing
economic and political interdependence between the United States and the
developing countries and it was premised upon the idea that the process of
development was mutually beneficial to both the United States and the Third
World.89
The six  "New Directions" principles were as  follows:  (1)  the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 was to be amended by the MDCA of 1973 and the name
of USAID was to be changed to the Mutual Development and Cooperation
Agency;  (2)  future U.S. bilateral aid should be focused on the  functional
categories of food production, rural development, and nutrition; population
planning and health;  and education and human resource development;
(3)  recipient countries should do more to design and implement  their own
developmental priorities and the United States should favor those countries
which sought to improve the  lies of their poorest majority through popular
participation;  (4)  bilateral aid should be increasingly channeled through
the private sector;  (5)  an Export Development Credit Fund should be created
to expand U.S. exports  to advance the development of the lowest income
countries;  and (6)  a single government agency should coordinate all
official development-related activities.90
In addition to the New Directions provisions, the  1973 FAA included
the  initial legislation of the 1970s  linking human rights and foreign aid.
this was a relatively inconspicuous  Senate initiative which stated:  "It  is
the  sense of Congress that  the President should deny any economic or
military assistance to the  government of any foreign country which18
practices  the  interment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for
political purposes." 91  Schoultz notes  that major credit  for raising the
level of congressional concern for human rights  is  given to an extended set
of hearings before Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations  and
Movements during 1973.92
During the summer of 1973, when the MDCA was debated by the House and
Senate committees,  the provision for the Export Development Credit Fund
received considerable criticism and was deleted.  This was because it was
thought to duplicate  services provided by the Export-Import Bank, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and USAID's
Development Loan Fund.93  On 26  July 1973,  the House version of the bill
was passed by five votes,  188-183. 94  The Senate version was passed on
3 October, by a vote of 54-42.95  In conference committee,  the House
provision to change the name of the Foreign Assistance Act to the Mutual
Development and Cooperation Act and to change the name of USAID to the MDCA
was deleted.9 6  The remaining provisions were signed into  law on
17  December, 1973.97
Congressional Reforms.  Congress clearly began to play a  more central
role  in the formulation of assistance strategy in  the early 1970s.  A brief
review of the reforms  in committee rules and procedures, and in
congressional-executive  relations, is necessary to understand the basis  for
the more active congressional role.
Sampson indicates  that although there is agreement  that Congress
became more active in  foreign affairs during the 1970s, but there is less
agreement as  to exactly why this occurred.  He identifies  four
explanations:  (1)  congressional assertiveness occurs  in cycles with war19
tending to end the swing to Congress;  (2) inept Presidents allow Congress
to become more involved in foreign policy;  (3) Vietnam created
congressional distrust of the executive and thus  changed the content and
the process of U.S. foreign policy;  and (4) new intermestic  issues  (ones
which cut across domestic and foreign politics) have created incentives for
Congress to become and to stay involved in foreign affairs. 98
Former House member Charles Whalen offers an interpretation of the
procedural changes  that tends  to emphasize  the third explanation.  He says
that procedural reforms, well underway by the mid-1960s, were supported by
anti-Vietnam members who saw them as  the only means of obtaining a vote on
the war.  Whalen maintains  that the reforms were adopted in piecemeal
fashion between 1970 and 1974 with the  three mutually reinforcing aims of
decentralizing power within the House;  creating greater openness  in House
procedures;  and strengthening the House's capacity to deal with the
executive branch.9 9
Specific reforms, many of which were contained in the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970,  included modification of the  seniority
principle  for selecting committee chairmen, which would tend to  eliminate
older  and more conservative chairs; expanding House member's personal
staffs and the Congressional Research Service, thus  enhancing House
information gathering capabilities;  expanding subcommittee rights;  and
restricting  the executive's war-making authority.10 0  Moreover, since 1970,
the Foreign Assistance Act has provided that any aid program or project can
be  required to end eight months after Congress vetoed it by concurrent
resolution.10120
In sum, the New Directions strategy was presaged by earlier action of
the congressional foreign affairs committees and in particular by House
action on Title  IX.  To  some extent the congressional reforms of the early
1970s acted as  a catalyst for advancing New Directions  in 1973.
Intellectual Sources
During the  1960s and early 1970s  there  seems  to have been a close
relationship between development  thought and official assistance policy.
Many ideas were conveyed to decision makers  in Congress and in USAID
through the academic literature,  congressional hearings, official  and
unofficial aid reports, conferences, professional staffs, and a variety of
informal channels.  By the early 1970s a number of foreign aid studies had
reacted against  the apparent failure of the  growth-oriented approaches of
the 1960s  and provided the intellectual basis  for New Directions.
Development thought in the 1960s  shifted in two  directions.10 2  First,
shortages in domestic savings and foreign exchange earnings were  identified
as potentially limiting factors on growth.  The counterpart in official
policy was to extend program-type lending to  fill the  foreign exchange gaps
in the LDCs. 103
A second focus  of the  1960s,  influenced by the emergence  of the  dual
economy literature, was on sectoral development and alter on sector lending
for agriculture  in the  late 1960s.104  As sectoral development processes
began to be better understood, the  importance of  investment in human
capital and of policies designed to overcome  resource scarcities through
technical assistance began to be appreciated.1 0 5
The 1960s also saw the multidisciplinary broadening of development
theory as  dual economy ideas transcended the  economic literature. 1 0 621
Studies by sociologists and political scientists viewed the transition from
a traditional state to  "modernity" as involving changes  in attitudes,1 07 as
well as  in social and political institutions. 108  Many of these studies
implied that development in the LDCs  should replicate the  transition to
modernity undertaken by the  industrialized countries.
Some analysts saw political development as part of the wider process
of modernization marked by three criteria:  structural differentiation,
subsystem autonomy, and cultural secularization.109  Huntington maintained
that the problem of political development was measurable and essentially
one of economic growth outstripping the pace of institutional development.
He argued that the most effective way to prevent  "political decay" was  to
broaden the degree to which people participated in the political
process. 110  These sorts  of ideas had provided the conceptual basis  for
Title IX.
According to Montgomery, the experiments  in political modernization
and administrative reform that these  ideas had generated later caused
disillusionment as  the expected results failed to materialize.  In this
view, an important outcome was public mistrust of bureaucracy and a
populist front advocating rural development and participation.111
The "Pearson Report" (1969) was an important mainstream study which
had been commissioned by the World Bank and headed by Lester Pearson,
former Prime Minister of Canada.  The report recommended:  (1)  the  removal
of some barriers to the exports of LDCs and the promotion of more favorable
conditions  for foreign direct  investment;  (2)  a volume of aid equal to
0.7 percent of the GNP of the DCs to sustain a growth rate of 6 percent per
annum in the LDCs;  (3)  redirection of technical assistance to  the problem22
areas  of agriculture, education, and population growth;  and
(4) strengthening and expanding the multilateral aid system through the use
of international  organizations. 112  The Pearson Report merited particular
attention in Nixon's  special message  to Congress for  its  description of
recent changes  that had been occurring in  the Third World.  Rostow
maintains that the report was especially important for  the negative
response  it evoked from many development specialists who thought  its
recommendations were too modest and conventional.11 3
Criticism of foreign aid was  launched from other circles also.  On the
left, some  analysts viewed development assistance as  an imperialist
conspiracy designed to  exploit Third World resources and cheap labor
through ties  of vested interest with Third World political and economic
elites.114
The criticism from the right emphasized the  role of foreign aid in
expanding the public sector and in concentrating political power in the
LDCs.115  Bauer argued these and other deleterious effects of foreign aid:
it  increased the recipient country's debt burden, raised inflation,
discouraged investment in agriculture and generally destroyed motivation
and market efficiency.116
A neomalthusian critique maintained that a "population-food collision"
in the Third World was inevitable with no hope for technological
solutions.117  The Paddocks argued that aid programs should be opposed
since there was no way to monitor their effectiveness. 118  In contrast, the
Ehrlichs  called for massive "unprecedented aid" and suggested a policy of
"triage"  for  some of the very poorest nations. 1 1 923
A populist critique focused on the technocratic biases in the
administration of aid resources.  This view held that development
assistance had minimal impact or tended to  increase income disparities and
strengthen the privileged position of large farmers  in the  developing
countries. 120
An important implicit critique was offered by the practice of the
International Labor Organization (ILO)  and the United Nations.  These were
among the  first to implement a "basic-needs" or "employment-oriented"
strategy.  The new course was not unlike that of the  international
organizations during the  "living standards movement" of the 1930s.121
In 1969,  the ILO  launched the World Employment Program with its
primary objectives being to  raise the  living standards  of the poor and to
provide them with more productive work opportunities.  Early ILO studies
were focused on issues such as  the relationship between population growth
and employment, the possibility of adopting more labor-intensive
technologies,  the  effect of trade expansion on employment, the  links
between educational systems and the labor market, urban employment
problems, and the  relationship between income distribution and
employment.122
In 1970, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) issued one of the  first general surveys on the scope and nature of
the employment problem in LDCs.123  The "basic-needs" approach was also
foreshadowed in United Nations studies of the early 1970s. 124  Similarly,
the World Bank became  involved in 1973, when its President, Robert
MacNamara, pledged his organization to direct its  resources toward24
improving the productivity and welfare of the rural poor in the poorest
countries.125
By May 1973,  a summary analysis of some of the major proposals for  the
reorganization of U.S.  development aid had been transmitted to  the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Congressional Research Service.  The
summary included the Perkins,  Rockefeller and Peterson Reports, as well  as
nine additional  studies.126  The CRS  summary discerned several common
themes:
(1)  Development assistance serves the national interest of the United
States and is  recognized as  an instrument of national security
policy.
(2)  Economic development  is a good thing in  its own right and that
fact should merit U.S. participation in the process.
(3)  Multilateral aid is more  disinterested than bilateral aid and
should play a larger role  in development.
(4)  Trade policy should be assigned a greater part, and barriers  to
entry of developing country products should be reduced.
(5)  Private investment should be assigned a greater part in
development.
(6)  Developing countries must play a greater part in  formulating
their own programs  and they must become more responsible for  the
consequences.
(7)  The requirements  of social justice, meaning popular participation
in decisions and ensuring that the benefits of development reach
the neediest, should be  taken into  greater account.25
(8)  Security assistance should be administered separately from
development assistance.127
Other key studies of the early 1970s  appeared to  show that not only
had there been a relative decline in the  living standards of the lowest
income groups  in the developing countries during the 1960s,  but that there
had also been an absolute decline in some cases.128  In a statistical study
of 74 developing countries, Adelman and Morris concluded that "economic
growth  itself not only tends  to be accompanied by actual declines in
political participation but is  one of the prime causes of income
inequality."129
An influential study by Edgar Owens, an official of USAID, and Robert
Shaw, a  member of the ODC, advocated a "new" development strategy based on
the participation of the rural poor.130  The strategy had been distilled
from the  "relatively successful experience of post-war Japan, Taiwan,
Korea, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Puerto Rico, and Israel" and  it was a reaction
against the  1960s policies of focusing investment on "capital-intensive
endeavors  in the big cities and on large farms." 131  The populist tone of
the book seems to have contributed to the  impact  it had on some members of
Congress.  Fraser says  that he saw Owens as one of the true  "practitioners"
of political development and the book as a kind of "natural evolution of
participatory thinking.  "32
James Grant, who was President of the ODC, says that ODC became the
principal advocate for the argument that "you could get growth with
trickle-up."133  He notes that  it was a very conscious effort on his part
to bring Owens and Shaw together to write the book.134 These  types of26
ideas, concerning the necessity of  growth with equity, provided the
intellectual basis  for New Directions.135
External Sources
If  intellectual thought informed the decisions of policymakers,  so  too
did events in  the international environment.  Since the House intended New
Directions  to better reflect the emerging interdependence between the
United States and the Third World, we now look to certain external  changes
which may have made that interdependence more evident.
The Legacy of Vietnam.  Perhaps  the legacy of U.S.  involvement in
Vietnam produced the most profound consequences affecting the timing and
direction of the BHN mandate.  We have seen that the war was a factor
contributing to  the  increasing assertiveness  of the House, but it also had
an impact on the Nixon doctrine and foreign aid strategies.  If public
support for the war was  relatively high in 1965, opposition to  the war
within the administration and Congress was  increasing by 1966.136  In
Congress,  Senator Fulbright argued that the United States had fallen victim
to  the  "arrogance of power" and was courting disaster.137  Fraser says  that
Vietnam was clearly a watershed in his thinking on foreign aid.  During
1965-67 he and some of his associates were forced to think very hard about
the assumptions  and goals  of U.S.  foreign policy.138  By 1967,  it was
apparent that the American military escalation had only resulted in a
stalemate with the North Vietnamese.139
The Tet Offensive  in January 1968 precipitated a full blown
revaluation of U.S. policy in Vietnam.  By March 1968, the new Secretary of
Defense, Clark Clifford, recommended the  scaling down of American
objectives to  a negotiated settlement instead of military victory.1 4 0 In27
so  doing the administration accepted the principle that South Vietnam
should do more to defend itselfl4 1--a concept already familiar to Congress
and one which formed the  central basis of the Nixon doctrine  of 1969.
The chronology of events demonstrated to Congress  the apparent failure
of what was  in essence America's most protracted and costly foreign aid
endeavor.  To some officials, current military and economic aid strategies
appeared no longer viable as  instruments of containment and thus new
strategies were required.
The Decline of Bipolarity.  The decline of bipolarity was a second
factor pointing in this  direction.  Bipolarity refers to the global
distribution of power between the United States and the  Soviet Union during
the period from roughly the  late 1940s until  the Cuban missile crisis of
1962.142
According to Kegley and Wittkopf, the bipolar system was characterized
by the primacy placed upon alliance systems, most notably the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, used to link each
superpower and its  allies for defensive and offensive purposes.  A main
feature of the system was  that each superpower's allies  gave it forward
strategic bases  in exchange for protection.14 3
Spanier maintains that by the mid-1960s,  the  erosion of the major cold
war ties led to a system, apparent by the early  1970s, more accurately
described as bipolycentric.14 4  Bipolycentrism refers  to a system
characterized by many centers of power, diverse relationships  among lesser
powers, and attempts by superpowers to establish alignments with the  lesser
powers.14528
Kegley and Wittkopf maintain that one of the major reasons for  the
decline of the bipolar system was  that rapid changes  in intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) technology decreased the usefulness of forward-
based missile  sites  and thus  decreased the usefulness of cohesive alliance
systems.  A second reason was that as  the military capabilities of the
superpowers became more evenly matched, the European NATO members began to
doubt whether the United States would actually be willing to  trade New York
City for Bonn or Paris  in  the advent of nuclear war.14 6
Thus the  decline of bipolarity suggested the need for the United
States  to  adopt new forms  of cooperation with the Third World for reasons
of national security.
The Economic Rise of the Third World.  A third factor may be  seen in
the  increasingly larger role of the Third World in international political
and economic affairs.  To  some officials  these changes constituted a
perceived threat  to  the United States.  A milder view, found in  the Pearson
Report, was that these changes had enabled the Third World to do more to
determine its own developmental priorities.  C. Fred Bergsten, senior
economist on the National Security Council from 1969  to 1971, voiced the
more extreme view when he warned:
Present U.S. policy neglects  the Third World almost entirely, with the
exception of our few remaining military clients  (mainly in Southeast
Asia).  This policy is  a serious mistake.  New U.S. economic
interests, which flow from the  dramatic changes in the position of the
United States in the world economy and the nature  of the new
international economic order, require renewed U.S.  cooperation with29
the Third World.  New policy instruments, including but going beyond
foreign aid, are needed to promote  such cooperation.147
In this view, as  the capabilities of the Third World grew stronger and
as  it became more self-confident, it appeared to pose a threat to  the
United States in three main economic areas:  (1) in natural resources, many
Third World countries had great potential for strategic market control and
for exerting political and economic leverage against  the United States;
(2) in investment,  the Third World countries could exercise leverage by
threatening confiscation of foreign-owned assets or massive repudiation of
their debts;  (3) in trade, developing countries could threaten U.S. exports
by cutting their own export prices or by becoming cheap "pollution havens."
Moreover, the United States appeared to need positive help from the Third
World in order to expand U.S.  trade, maintain the  international monetary
system, and stem the  flow of narcotics.14 8
In sum, the legacy of Vietnam, the decline of bipolarity, and the
rising economic power of the Third World pointed to  the fading of the
absolute dominance of the United States in world affairs.  This was made
more evident  in the early 1960s by the recovery of Western Europe and Japan
from the effects of World War II and in the early 1970s by the collapse of
the U.S.-led international monetary system.  These  factors may have
demonstrated the need to adopt new strategies for gaining the allegiance
and cooperation of the Third World.
Societal Sources
In 1964, President Johnson launched the Great Society program, which,
with its emphasis on relieving urban poverty, was a sort of domestic analog
to New Directions.  As  the decade progressed, the  relative abundance of its30
early years  gave way to resource scarcities and an emerging environmental
movement.  During these years foreign policy began to reflect  intermestic
political concerns,  and foreign aid budgets were  cut back by the late
1960s.
Public Opinion.  The political science literature  indicates that
public opinion seldom has a direct impact on foreign policy. 14 9  Since
public opinion may occasionally act as  either a constraint on, or as  a
stimulus  to,  foreign policy innovation, however, we look for relevant
changes  in public attitudes which may have affected New Directions.
Surveys of public attitudes toward development assistance  issues
suggest that public  interest and knowledge are limited and that domestic
issues  are of primary concern.  These surveys generally indicate a
continuity in the  level of public support for development aid.  A late
1960s  study showed that "small, quite constant, majorities of between 51
and 58 percent have  on successive occasions from 1958  to 1966  said they
were  in favor of foreign aid."150  The Chicago Council  on Foreign Relations
reported similar findings concerning public support for foreign aid during
the  1960s. 151  An early 1966 Gallup poll found 53 percent of the American
public was  in favor of foreign aid.152
A detailed survey on developmental  issues by the ODC concluded that an
historic high level  of 68 percent of Americans favored foreign aid in
1972. 153  However, the high figure was not supported by the 1974 Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations poll which showed only 52 percent in favor of
aid.  A 1986  survey sponsored by the ODC and InterAction154  found  that the
level of public backing for  foreign economic aid had remained fairly steady
over the past four decades.  The survey found that  54 percent of the publicapproved of foreign aid in 1986  and 39 percent opposed.155  Both the 1972
and 1987  surveys found that the major reasons given by Americans  for
favoring economic assistance reflected a  humanitarian concern with economic
and political concerns  "being far less  important."156
Since public opinion toward foreign aid was characterized by
continuity rather than change during the  study period, we would expect it
to have had little impact on New Directions.  Several analysts have
concluded, however, that the  "internationalist"1 57  mood of the American
public began to erode during the  late 1960s  to mid-1970s, owing to
differing perceptions of the meaning of the Vietnam war. 158   This erosion
of "internationalism" may have had an indirect impact on New Directions
since some key members of Congress saw it as pointing to diminishing
support for foreign aid and the need to adopt new approaches.  Senator
Fulbright evidenced this view in June 1973, when he stated:
There is,  I  believe, general agreement that the traditional foreign
economic aid program does not command the  support of Congress  or  the
public.  What is needed, in my opinion, is not a cosmetic job to make
foreign aid a  more  salable package to the public and Congress, but a
thorough study of the entire spectrum of our Nation's economic
relationships with the developing countries,  of which foreign aid is
only a small factor.1 59
In sum, the evidence  suggests that public opinion had an indirect
impact on New Directions.  It seems  that Congress was responding to an
increased public caution or skepticism concerning foreign commitments that









The  Erosion  of "Internationalist"  Attitudes  in









- Total  Internationalis -
t
-a
Total  Isolationist  ,-
J  · · ~···
I  i  ~  I  i  I  I  I  I  I  I
1968 1972 1976
SOURCE;  Watts and  Free, 1976: 21.  Reprinted with permission from Foreign Policy, 24 (Fall  1976).
Copyright  1976 by Carnegie  Endowment for International  Peace.
*  Trends based on questions asked of national cross-sections of the public in years shown.  The figures
for 1964 and 1968 are derived from responses to five statements concerning the general posture that
the United  States should assume in  world affairs.  The figures for 1972,1974,1975, and  1976 reflect
responses to the same set of five statements,  as well as two new statements regarding possible U.S.
military  intervention in  defense of allies.






However, in the  eyes of Congress, Vietnam discredited traditional
assistance and made it necessary to provide the public with New Directions.
The Coalition of 1972.  Several analysts have concluded that the
influence of special interest groups on American foreign policy began to
increase in the  1960s as U.S.  involvement in Vietnam expanded.  They
maintain that the antiwar lobby of the  late  1960s,  through its access  in
Congress and in Washington, built a base for future interest group
access.160  A related view is  that  the congressional reforms of the early
1970s  facilitated interest-group access.161  This might add to our
understanding of the  role played by special  interest groups, such as the
ODC,  in affecting New Directions.
On 20 April, 1973,  after the House had sent its foreign aid letter to
the President without receiving a reply, Fraser met with James P. Grant at
the ODC to discuss what the next step should be.  This encounter led to  a
series of five or six breakfast meetings to discuss  the content and
strategy of a new foreign aid bill.162  The meetings were hosted by Reps.
Zablocki and Fraser and were attended by a group of 7-10 congressmen.1 63
James P. Grant spoke at three of these meetings and brought with him the
outlines of what was  to become New Directions.16 4  This included a
provision for  the Export Development Credit Fund, which was designed to
mobilize an additional amount of money.165
James Howe and Charles Paolillo of the ODC attended some of these
meetings as did Edgar Owens of USAID.166  Paolillo was a  visiting lawyer
from USAID who was asked to write the bill.  According to Grant, Paollilo
was entirely responsible for the original draft of the legislation which
was then handed over to the House.167 The ODC strategy centered on how to33
"get back equity with growth."  It was also aimed to mobilize an additional
constituency.  Thus,  the ODC lined up and wrote the testimony of a number
of witnesses who appeared before the House during June.168   Later in June
many of the  same witnesses  also testified in favor of the new foreign aid
bill before the Senate.
In his  testimony, Orville Freeman, former Secretary of agriculture,
President of the Business International Corp, addressed only the  Export
Credit Fund portion of the bill.1 69  He endorsed the fund on the  grounds
that  it would repair America's noncompetitive export position  in the low-
income markets  and pointed to  the success of a "parallel program"--Public
Law 480.
Edward Mason, professor emeritus, Harvard University and member of the
Board of Trustees  of the Overseas Development Council, was  the  first person
to deal directly with the New Directions proposals. 170  Mason endorsed the
bill's purpose  to redirect aid to the poorest sectors and also  its emphasis
on private initiative.  He also supported the bill's aim to  separate
developmental from military and political objectives  and its  "most novel"
aspect--the U.S.  Export Development Credit Fund.  Mason maintained that the
fund would have a pronounced effect on the geographic allocation of aid
since it  intended to limit potential borrowers to countries having per
capita  incomes of less than U.S. $200.
Tony T. Dechant who was the chairman of  the Advisory Committee on
Overseas Cooperative Development and President of the National Farmers
Union,171 was accompanied by representatives of the  international
cooperative movement, who added their support to the House proposals. 1 7 2
Dechant said that cooperatives could continue to help large numbers of the34
rural and urban poor unlike large capital projects which relied on
"trickle-down" approaches.  He also said that cooperatives  strengthened
local-level institutions and encouraged participation of the poor.
The first person to deal with the proposed New Directions changes in
detail was James P. Grant, President of the Overseas Development
Council.173  His testimony is the clearest and most extensive public
explanation of the bill's six main proposals.174  Grant maintained that
development ought to "encompass minimum human needs  of man for food,
health, and education, and for a job which can give him both the means to
acquire these basic needs as well as a  psychological sense of participating
usefully in the world around him."  Citing Development Reconsidered, he
said that the  recent experience of a number of poor countries demonstrated
that these goals could be met through an effective combination of domestic
and international policies.
The largest portion of Grant's testimony was devoted to a discussion
of the  Export Development Credit Fund, the purpose of which was  to make
credits available  for financing U.S.  exports--primarily "electrical
products, heavy construction equipment, and fertilizers"--to countries with
less  than $200 per capita annual GNP.  According to Grant, the  fund seemed
"an ingenious idea"  to increase exports  "by some $1 billion a year at no
additional cost to  the taxpayer."
Grant also justified the bill on the grounds  that "international
politics and power relationship are changing, with security concerns  givin
way to economic  issues among nations."  These changes  "require the U.S. and
other rich nations  to pay greater attention to the needs and desires of
many developing countries."35
In a letter that appeared on the House record, Vice-President
Edward E. Hood of General Electric wrote  that his company strongly endorsed
the proposed legislation since it would "substantially serve to  stimulate
U.S. exports  to underdeveloped nations, contribute very significantly to  an
improved U.S. balance of payments,  and generate thousands of new jobs."17 5
In another  letter on the House record, Leonard Woodcock, President of
the United Auto, Aerospace, and Agricultural  Implement Workers of America,
endorsed the aim to redirect development assistance  to the poorest people
and noted that aid met only a small part of the need for foreign exchange
earnings  in the poor countries.  He emphasized the  importance the UAW
attached to an open trading system and supported the Export Fund as  a way
of both increasing U.S. exports and assisting Third World development.1 76
In his  letter on the House record, David Rockefeller, President of the
Chase Manhattan Bank, backed the bill on the grounds  that it directed
assistance  to the neediest people in the poor countries.  He also approved
the  Export Fund on the grounds  that  it would make the  financing of U.S.
exports more competitive with that of other rich countries.177
Edgar Owens, an official in the USAID and the senior author of
Development Reconsidered, did not testify before  the House but prepared a
lengthy statement for  the record which repeated the central thesis of his
book.17 8
James MacCracken, chairman of the American Council of Voluntary
Agencies  (ACVA)179  testified together with the executive directors of the
major religious relief agencies.180  He said that in ACVA, which
represented a  constituency of 41 voluntary agencies working in foreign36
service,  there was  general consensus for support of the bill since  it
brought aid "down to the  level of the people."
Lucy Wilson Benson, President of The League of Women Voters, provided
a letter for the House record that endorsed each of the bill's main
provisions.181
Primary criticism of the proposed legislation was furnished by
William C. Paddock, author and consultant in tropical agriculture.  He
repeated his earlier thesis that the U.S. foreign aid program should be
discontinued since its effectiveness could not be determined.182
In sum, interest groups played a supportive role in promoting New
Directions.  This seems to have been mainly because Congress recruited
interest group backing, but also because  "basic needs" enjoyed a broad-
based appeal, and some groups had attained increased access to Congress as
a result of the Vietnam War.  Thus,  in 1973  an effective coalition was
formed among liberal congressmen, some members of USAID, the ODC, the
international cooperative movement, some members of big business, and those
representing humanitarian concerns.
Beyond New Directions
During the mid-1970s a number of changes were effected in USAID
policies that reflected the  thrust of the New Directions  legislation.
Country Development Strategy Analyses were required to give special
attention to the analysis of the extent and sources of poverty.
Agriculture, rural development, health, nutrition, and family planning
received increased emphasis  in the development assistance budget.183  The
basic needs orientation of USAID was  complemented by the efforts  of the37
World Bank and a number of bilateral donors  including Canada, Britain, the
Netherlands, and the Nordic countries.1 84
Changes in  the regional allocation of development assistance also
reflected a shift away from the relatively high per capita income LDCs  and
toward the poorest countries.  In Latin America programs  in Uruguay,
Brazil, and Venezuela were phased out.  In Asia there was increased focus
of mission activity in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines;
assistance  to Korea was  terminated.  There was  a rise in the number of
USAID missions in Africa from 8 in 1973  to 28  in 1980 and there was  a
growing support for  the programs of private voluntary organizations.185
During the  1970s the basic needs and human rights orientation of U.S.
foreign policy began to develop in tandem.  Schoultz maintains that by
adopting human rights  as  the soul of his foreign policy, President Carter
legitimized a humanitarian concern in much the  same way that John Kennedy
had legitimized economic aid through the Alliance for Progress. 186
Similarly, the Nixon doctrine and detente provided a window in which the
strategic and humanitarian objectives of economic assistance were in
relative harmony.  This enabled humanitarian concerns  to rise  to  the  fore
and reshape  the foreign aid program.
By the end of the decade, however, the New Directions  thrust had begun
to falter.  Security concerns, particularly in the Middle East, began to
receive a higher priority.  The supporting assistance budget rose  in
relation to development assistance.  Israel and Egypt became the  two
largest recipients of aid from the United States.38
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